How Significant was Winston Churchill to the Evacuation of Dunkirk?

A Historical Investigation

‘’The Withdrawal from Dunkirk, June 1940'’ by Charles Cundall

Introduction:

On May 10th, 1940, Winston Churchill became Britain’s new Prime Minister. Britain had been at war with Germany since September of 1939 and had, at that time, been under the command of Neville Chamberlain. Chamberlain sent a major portion of the British army, designated as the British Expeditionary Force, or BEF, to France and Belgium to counter Germany’s progression into Western Europe. What Churchill inherited from Chamberlain, however, was a BEF that was losing both ground and men to the German advancement (“Speech on the Evacuation of Dunkirk” 359).

19th May:

Lord Gort, commander of the French divisions of the BEF, warned the War Cabinet that there was a possibility the army would be caught between two German forces, one fighting its way up the Ardennes and one through northern Belgium, and offered the possibility of evacuation through the Channel ports (“Speech on the Evacuation of Dunkirk” 359). The Chief of the Imperial General Staff, General Ironside, said that they should not take this path due to the impossibility of evacuating any substantial portion of the army. Churchill agreed with Ironside and the Cabinet consented that the BEF should travel southward to Amiens and join up with the French army (“War Cabinet Conclusions” 95–97). This exchange indicates that Churchill, along with the entire War Cabinet, did not have any intention of evacuating troops from France, just 6 days away from what would become the historical event, which is significant because Churchill’s appointment to the position of Prime Minister was based on his strong will and fighting spirit, qualities which Chamberlain lacked (Hamilton 72). Churchill stated in his first address to the House of Representatives: “I beg to move, that this House welcomes the formation of a Government representing the united and inflexible resolve of the nation to prosecute the war with Germany to a victorious conclusion” (Churchill “Blood, Toil, Tears and Sweat”). Chamberlain wished to sue for peace, not to fight (Korda 13). So in this instance, Chamberlain may have begun the evacuation early.

20th May:

German panzers reached Abbeville and the BEF was now surrounded on three sides (“Speech on the Evacuation of Dunkirk” 359). At this time both Ironside and Churchill began exploring what would be necessary for a full-scale withdrawal from France (“War Cabinet Conclusions” 100). While Churchill’s quick adaptation to the situation was admirable, Lord Gort saw the danger of the German pincer move before anyone in the War Cabinet and they ordered him to act counter to his instinct.

21st May:

Ironside had visited France and returned with the news that he saw an opportunity to defeat the German armored divisions to the west and Churchill, once again, agreed to continue moving south. They suspected the Germans were heading to the ports of Boulogne and Calais in France, as well as Bruges in Belgium (“War Cabinet Minutes” 129). Taking these ports would mean little to the Germans, as even Churchill voiced, due to their preferred method of attacking the British mainland with the air force (“War Cabinet Minutes” 131). But, one reason for occupying the ports would be to surround the British and prevent any evacuation. Churchill, however, said to the Cabinet that he saw no immediate risk of the Germans occupying the French ports. Ironside even expressed the necessity to deal with the German Panzers quickly because they could expect reinforcements to be flown or parachuted in (“War Cabinet Minutes” 129). This lack of foresight Churchill wielded could have led to catastrophe for the BEF. In fact, perhaps the only reason it didn’t was that of a stroke of luck. Hitler ordered a full stop for two days of the western tank divisions on the 24th which gave enough time to set up a strong perimeter around Dunkirk while the evacuation began (Atkin 119). Hitler saved the BEF from Churchill’s negligence by being negligent himself.

23rd May:

General Weygand of the French forces sent a telegram to Britain agreeing to the plan outlined by the War Cabinet to retake the western front but had emphasized the necessity of holding Boulogne and Calais (“War Cabinet Minutes” 145). Churchill, however, after considering observations made by the Lord Privy Seal about the German pincer, had decided that it would be best for the BEF to fall back to the Channel ports. This shift in position came just as General Weygand took Amiens, Albert, and Peronne and his success boosted support of the original plan (“War Cabinet Conclusions” 124). So Churchill agreed to continue, although, he did send a telegram to Lord Gort informing him that should he find himself unable to continue the fight he should retreat to the ports (“War Cabinet Conclusions” 125). This is unusual because Churchill is well known for his stubbornness and undying resolve. In this situation, however, he is just the opposite. Upon his appointment as Prime Minister, Churchill created the position of Minister of Defence to rank above the other three branch leaders of the military. His goal was to use that power to be decisive, efficient, and resolute in desperate decisions (Churchill 14). Yet here Churchill resolves to allowed a faulty plan to continue on the slim chance of regaining ground and boosting morale.

25th May:

The Cabinet believed that Lord Gort was continuing his southward advancement but then received word that he had withdrawn two divisions from Arras without consulting them first. Lord Gort’s communications had been cut off and he had made the decision to begin the evacuation himself (“War Cabinet Minutes” 160). Churchill had no part in actually beginning the evacuation and had he, due to the communication blackout, he might have waited too long. His greatest contribution to the evacuation, however, also came on this day. The men stationed at Calais had been fighting the German Panzers coming from the west but were growing short on supplies and ammo (“War Cabinet Conclusions” 125). While most of the BEF had not reached Dunkirk, the possibility of getting cut off from the mainland was growing greater. Churchill finally recognized this and stated that it was imperative that they hold on to Calais (“War Cabinet Minutes” 160). The Cabinet agreed and Churchill sent the following telegram to Brigadier Nicholson: “Every hour you continue to exist is of the greatest help to the BEF. Government has therefore decided you must continue to fight. Have greatest possible admiration for your splendid stand. Evacuation will not (repeat not) take place”. Churchill recorded feeling physically sick after making this decision (Kaufmann and Kaufmann 251–252). He was, after all, sending thousands of men to guaranteed death or imprisonment (Swain). This decision was not only Churchill’s greatest contribution but it was also the greatest defense of the BEF during the entire effort. Had Calais been evacuated, the Germans would have had a clear path to Dunkirk once Hitler lifted the halt order on the 26th (Churchill “We Shall Fight on the Beaches”). However, the German general and historian Heinz Guderian was of the opinion that the siege of Calais “had no effect on the operations against Dunkirk” (Atkin 119). although it is likely that he misjudged as the evacuation of Dunkirk had already begun by the time Calais surrendered.

26th May:

Churchill is now seen taking a larger role in the evacuation effort. When the Cabinet began a discussion on the possibility of using Italy to moderate peace talks with Hitler, Churchill said that the only thing to be discussed this day was the evacuation. He also issued the message to General Weygand that he should order the entire BEF to march to the coast (“War Cabinet Conclusions” 148).

27th May:

Churchill asked General Ironside to message Lord Gort and make clear the position that he wants the French army’s safety to be placed second to the BEF’s (“War Cabinet Conclusions” 161).

29th May:

Churchill differed the choice of how to conduct air resistance over Dunkirk to the Air Staff (“War Cabinet Minutes” 190). It was also the Admiralty, on the 25th, that made the decision to commission civilian boats to aid the evacuation (“War Cabinet Conclusions” 140). While these weren’t Churchill’s direct responsibilities, this evidence does demonstrate his lack of involvement when it came to military tactics which makes him less significant towards the whole operation.

31st May:

The Secretary of State for War, Anthony Eden, received a message from Lord Gort asking whether he should continue resistance along the Dunkirk border to allow more French troops to evacuate or whether he should withdraw the remaining British troops. Eden had responded that they should pursue the second course of action and the War Cabinet agreed. Churchill, who had been absent from this meeting, had asked the Cabinet to make decisions in his absence (“War Cabinet Minutes” 208). This reveals the Cabinet’s competence in organizing and executing actions on their own. Churchill wasn’t needed for this decision and perhaps could have been replaced, had it been necessary, during others.

Conclusion:

From May 25th to June 3rd, 211,258 British and 84,675 French troops were successfully evacuated from Dunkirk and only about 20,700 members of the BEF were unaccounted for (“War Cabinet Minutes” 241). Churchill had become Prime Minister of Britain just 15 days earlier and it is probably for this reason that he demonstrated ineptitude through the onset of the historical moment. He chose to go on the offensive even after a warning that retreat may be necessary and ignored vital information that could have led to the Germans blocking the ports. However, he was also responsible for the choice to not evacuate the men at Calais which potentially saved the whole operation. And despite what Guderian believes, 27,936 men were evacuated while the British held him back at Calais (Atkin 5). For this reason, it is evident that, although he did not contribute much to organizing the evacuation, Churchill was significant to its defense.

Bibliography:

• Atkin, Ronald. Pillar of Fire: Dunkirk 1940. Birlinn, 2000.
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• Moss, Joyce, and George Wilson. ““Speech on the Evacuation at Dunkirk”.” Literature and Its Times: Profiles of 300 Notable Literary Works and the Historical Events that Influenced Them, vol. 4: World War II to the Affluent Fifties (1940–1950s), Gale, 1997, pp. 356–363.
• Swain, Gill. “DUNKIRK: 60 YEARS AGO TODAY: 3,500 Men Were Sent to Calais to Hold Germans at Bay.They Fought to the Last Bullet.” The Mirror (London, England), 27 May 2000.
• “WAR CABINET CONCLUSIONS.” The National Archives, WAR CABINET CONCLUSIONS, 1940.
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